British Politics, the Welfare State, and Tort Liability of Public Authorities by Priel, Dan
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Osgoode Digital Commons
All Papers Research Papers, Working Papers, ConferencePapers
2010
British Politics, the Welfare State, and Tort Liability
of Public Authorities
Dan Priel
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, dpriel@osgoode.yorku.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Papers, Working Papers, Conference Papers at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in All Papers by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Repository Citation
Priel, Dan, "British Politics, the Welfare State, and Tort Liability of Public Authorities" (2010). All Papers. Paper 253.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/all_papers/253
BRITISH POLITICS, THE WELFARE STATE, AND 
TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES  
Danny Priel* 
Abstract. There has been a notable shift in the scope of negligence liability of public 
authorities in the Post War period. Notably there was a trend toward restriction of 
liability in the 1980s. This essay tries to explain why this happened not by focusing on 
changing legal formulas but by examining the political context of the law in this area. I 
begin the essay by demonstrating how changes in the attitudes toward the role of the 
state in Post-War Britain have led to the changes in the law in this area. I then go on to 
examine the impact of Thatcher’s ascent to power. Some commentators have suggested 
that the restriction in liability that took place during the years of her premiership was 
the result of the impact of Thatcherite ideology on the courts. I consider why such an 
ideology might be used to justify restriction of liability on public authorities, but argue 
that such arguments are quite different from those actually found in court decisions 
from that period. Though founded on ideas that can be called broadly ‘conservative’, 
they do not reflect the distrust of state institutions typical in New Right writings, but 
are rather based on great respect for them, a view that reflects a different strand of 
conservatism. I demonstrate this attitude from the cases and offer some explanations for 
its possible adoption by the courts.  
Keywords: tort, conservatism, public authorities, negligence, ideology, New 
Right. 
Introduction 
[T]he ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves 
to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of 
some defunct economist. … I am sure that the power of invested interests is 
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, 
indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic 
and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new 
theories after a certain interval…. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested 
interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.1 
Keynes’s General Theory is now back in fashion, something that may be the 
ultimate vindication of its famous concluding words. But these words are 
relevant not only to economists and political philosophers, they are relevant to 
lawyers as well. For in law, and perhaps especially in the academic study of law, 
* Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School; Assistant Professor, University of Warwick 
School of Law. I presented this essay in a staff seminar at Warwick and I thank my colleagues for 
their many interesting and useful comments.  
1 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan, 
1936) 383-384. 
2it is the ‘practical men’ who examine the law exclusively through the prism of 
doctrinal rules who fail to see how much the rules they are analysing are subject 
to the encroachment of ideas. This essay is an attempt to examine this insight in 
one area, that of negligence liability of public authorities.  
Being at the intersection of public and private, liability of public 
authorities seems particularly apt for such an analysis, but though there is no 
lack of theoretical work on tort law, this area has remained relatively 
unexplored. Work in this area that draws on moral philosophy usually considers 
tort law to be fundamentally a set of rules of individual moral responsibility, 
which operate in relative autonomy from broader political or social context.2 In 
the case of economic analysis of tort law, the lack of concern for this question is 
due to the application of a microeconomic model to explain tort liability. In 
that model tort liability is based on assessing the costs and benefits that accrue 
from various activities. To be sure, these costs are likely to be different for 
different actors, but the model does not call for any special treatment of the 
fact that the state is involved in the activity. 
By contrast, doctrinal work usually follows the courts in treating this area 
as one governed by special rules and thus partly separate from negligence 
liability in general. But work in this mould usually focuses on careful analysis of 
the legal rules enunciated in court decisions in an attempt—often against rather 
long odds—to reconcile them and show how they all fit a certain set of 
principles. I do not wish to belittle the significance of this work. As some 
commentators have said, this is an area of law which ‘has threatened to descend 
into chaos’ and is in ‘continuing search for coherence’,3 and close examination of 
the case-law can help distinguish the bad arguments (of which this area seems 
have more than its fair share) from the good ones.4 But there is a limit to what 
can be achieved by this approach when the impact of broader normative 
considerations is not brought into the picture. What is missing is an 
examination of the proper scope of state action and the relationship between 
the state and the individuals subject to its powers. To put it starkly, one cannot 
adequately answer the question for what the state may be liable to individuals 
in tort unless one has some idea on the question what the state owes 
individuals. And this, plainly, is a political question about which the focus on 
2 This is quite explicit in Arthur Ripstein, ‘The Division of Responsibility and the Law of 
Tort’ (2004) 72 Fordham L Rev 1811-44, 1814-1815, 1830; John CP Goldberg & Benjamin C 
Zipursky, ‘Accidents of the Great Society’ (2005) 64 Maryland L Rev 364-408, 368, 391.  
3 MJ Bowman & SH Bailey, ‘Public Authority Negligence Revisited’ (2000) 59 CLJ 85-132, 
132; Stephen Bailey, ‘Public Authority Liability in Negligence: The Continued Search for 
Coherence’ (2006) 26 LS 155-84. The same view is expressed in the Law Commission’s 
Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (Consultation Paper No. 187, 2008) §3.148. 
4 Among many others see Richard O’Dair, ‘Murphy v Brentwood District Council: A House 
with Firm Foundations?’ (1991) 54 MLR 561-70; Marianne Giles & Erika Szyszczak, ‘Negligence 
and Defective Buildings: Demolishing the Foundations of Anns’ (1991) 11 LS 85-102; BS 
Markesinis & Simon Deakin, ‘The Random Element of their Lordships’ Infallible Judgment: An 
Economic and Comparative Analysis of the Tort of Negligence from Anns to Murphy’ (1992) 55 
MLR 619-46. 
3doctrine is largely unhelpful, if not positively harmful for tending to focus 
attention on certain verbal formulas instead of the underlying normative 
questions. 
Examining these matters is significant not only for answering the 
normative questions on what the scope of tort liability on public authorities 
should be. It can also help us understand major trends and shifts in the law, and 
can thus help in understanding the state of the law exactly by highlighting the 
bigger picture that more fine-grained doctrinal analysis tends to miss. For 
example, exclusive focus on legal rules can offer only limited help in explaining 
why English courts have adopted a very restrictive attitude to the imposition of 
tort liability on public bodies, one for which it is difficult to find comparison in 
other jurisdictions.5 Another such question, and the one which will be the 
subject of this essay, is what can explain the marked change in attitude toward 
negligence liability of public authorities that took place in the 1980s. 
At a doctrinal level one can begin with the recent history of the courts’ 
attitude toward negligence liability in general and trace the changes with regard 
to public authorities to the changes in the ‘tests’ for finding a duty of care. In 
the familiar story it was Anns v Merton London Borough Council,6 coincidentally 
or not a government liability case, that ushered in the ‘two-stage test’, which 
was rejected thirteen years later in favour of the seemingly more restrictive 
‘three-stage test’ of Caparo.7 It is thus tempting to explain the change in the 
area of liability of public authorities as part of a more general shift in the scope 
of negligence liability. But this account does not really answer our puzzle: for 
the change in the ‘test’, and prior to it the sense that such a change is needed, 
must have been based on something not found in the tests themselves. When 
the House of Lords overruled Anns this was explained by the fact that the 
latter decision ‘did not proceed upon any basis of established principle, but 
introduced a new species of liability’.8 This was said despite the fact that earlier 
cases, in particular Dorset Yacht (still considered good law today), adopted a 
very similar formulation to the one supposedly created out of whole cloth in 
Anns.9 To the extent that Anns was a development that went somewhat 
beyond Dorset Yacht, this by itself is a commonplace in the history of the 
common law, and of which twentieth century tort law provides numerous 
examples.  
In fact, even at the doctrinal level the change in test is not particularly 
illuminating, especially if we bear in mind that the law lords themselves have 
5 See Basil Markesinis et al., Tortious Liability of Statutory Bodies: A Comparative and 
Economic Analysis of Five English Cases (Oxford: Hart, 1999). 
6 [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
7 Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL). 
8 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, 471 (HL) (Lord Keith). 
9 See Dorset Yacht v Home Office [1970] AC 1004, 1027 (HL); McGhee v National Coal 
Board [1972] 1 WLR 1, 6 (HL); cf Cooper v Hobart [2000] SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537 at [27] 
(‘Anns did not purport to depart from the negligence test of Donoghue v Stevenson but merely 
sought to elucidate it by explicitly recognizing its policy component.).  
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frequently warned against paying too much attention to the verbal tests that 
govern the question of duty of care.10 After all, the tests for duty of care in both 
Anns and Caparo are extremely vague, and it is not too difficult to reach post-
Caparo outcomes using the Anns test, and vice versa: on the one hand, the 
House of Lords began narrowing liability for public authorities before the Anns 
test was officially overruled in 1990;11 on the other, there are a few decisions 
from recent years that seem to have adopted a more expansive approach to 
duty of care in a manner more reminiscent of the spirit of Anns than to that of 
Caparo. 
Thus, even though the decision in Caparo was presented as returning the 
law to its correct course after the ill-advised and unfounded aberration of Anns, 
Basil Markesinis and his colleagues are, I think, closer to the mark when they 
say that Caparo and subsequent cases that followed it can equally be called the 
work of activist judges who departed from earlier principles.12 We let ourselves 
off too easily by saying that the earlier case was ‘wrongly decided’, that it should 
be ‘confined to its facts’. House of Lords decisions are not the result of some 
unconsidered extempore, and in the case of Anns one that was made 
unanimously. The same is true in the other direction. To the courts and many 
contemporary commentators Dorset Yacht and Anns seemed natural and 
justified extensions of Donoghue v Stevenson,13 but to say that the courts in 
those cases simply recognised a broad general principle that had not been fully 
articulated in earlier cases is equally unhelpful. Such conclusions are never 
required by the earlier decisions, so something else outside the cases must have 
been at work. The question is what it was. 
Before getting to this question, we must, however, attend to the question 
how we are to find out. One approach, associated in the UK particularly with 
the work of John Griffith, looks for an answer to these sorts of questions in the 
judges’ personal background. Griffith has pointed out that the vast majority of 
judges in the Court of Appeal and House of Lords come from a particularly 
narrow background, have similar education and professional experience, are 
white, male, and are appointed at an age that tends to lead them to a 
conservative political and social outlook.14 Griffith examined various areas of 
                                                                                                                           
10 See, e.g., Custom and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 
AC 181 at [35] (Lord Hoffmann); Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 633 (Lord 
Oliver). 
11 See Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson Co Ltd [1985] AC 
210 (HL); see also Yuen Kun Yeu v A.G. (Hong Kong) [1988] AC 175 (PC). Similarly, the Canadian 
Supreme Court continues to adhere to Anns, even after its rejection in its country of origin; 
nonetheless, it recently moved closer to the post-Caparo English approach. See Cooper at [28], 
[37]-[39]. 
12 Simon Deakin et al., Markesinis & Deakin’s Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
6th ed., 2008) 414 n 102. 
13 [1932] AC 562 (HL). See note 9 above. 
14 See JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 5th ed., 1997) 18-22, 
passim. Recent statistics reveal similar biographical patterns. See Sutton Trust Briefing Note: The 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
law and argued that in these areas the judgments display a clear conservative 
bias, which he explained by the judges’ background. The connection between 
the two was provided by the broadly Marxist perspective Griffith adopted, one 
according to which the judges’ class interests inevitably determine their 
political, and hence legal, consciousness. Although within this theoretical 
framework such a link is close to being treated as conceptual, those who do not 
adopt this framework are unlikely to be convinced by the link Griffith drew 
between the judges’ background and their decisions.15 Even someone 
sympathetic to the idea that the judges inadvertently promote in their 
judgments certain values or interests may find the almost exclusive focus on the 
judges’ class (as reflected in their parents’ occupation and their educational 
background) too simplistic or reductive. 
In the United States Griffith’s approach has been studied in much greater 
depth and sophistication, relying on statistical analysis of vast datasets resulting 
in what has been described as an ‘oppressively comprehensive’ examination of 
‘every aspect of the [US] Supreme Court’.16 By contrast in the UK such studies 
are almost unheard of.17 Lacking the data for such an empirical analysis, I still 
wish to examine the development of the effect of changing political 
atmosphere on the law developed by judges. The underlying assumption 
necessary for making such a claim is rather weak: it is, quite simply, that judges 
are human. This seemingly trivial assumption means that they are likely to be 
subject to the very same psychological mechanisms that research has shown 
have affect all humans: cognitive biases, framing effects, and perhaps 
particularly relevant in this context, cultural worldview.18 After all, even the 
most original thinkers are, in some ways, a reflection of their age; and judges are 
rarely original thinkers.  
For the sake of examining the hypothesis that the law on the negligence 
liability of public authorities has been influenced by changing political attitudes, 
I rely on the traditional method of examining the central cases in the field 
                                                                                                                           
Educational Backgrounds of the UK’s Top Solicitors, Barristers and Judges, available at 
http://www.suttontrust.com/reports/Comparison_educational_backgrounds.pdf. 
15 It is indeed no surprise that Griffith’s work has been severely criticised along these very 
lines. See Kenneth Minogue, ‘The Biases of the Bench’, Times Literary Supplement (6 Jan. 1978) 11; 
Simon Lee, Judging Judges (London: Faber, 1988) 33-39.  
16 Adam Liptak, ‘In a Polarized Court, Getting the Last Word’ New York Times (8 March 
2010). 
17 There are only two works I am familiar with, both written by the same person, that 
attempt a similar examination of House of Lords decisions. See David Robertson, ‘Judicial 
Ideology in the House of Lords: A Jurimetric Analysis’ (1982) 12 Brit J Pol Sci 1-25; David 
Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) ch. 2.  
18 Perhaps not surprisingly, judges are usually much more forthcoming in admitting such 
influences than the doctrinal scholars who analyse their work without any hint that politics or 
human psychology has had an impact on the law. For some examples see Viscount Radcliffe, 
‘Law and Order’ in Not in Feather Beds: Some Collected Papers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968) 
211, 212-214; Patrick Devlin, ‘Judges, Government, and Politics’ (1978) 41 MLR 501-11, 509; Lord 
Mustill, ‘What Do Judges Do?’ (1996) 7 Juridisk Tidskrift 611-24, 619, 622-624; cf McFarlane v 
Tayside Health Board [2000] 2 AC 59, 82-83 (Lord Steyn). 
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(together with some extra-judicial writings of active judges). Though judges 
often work hard to hide any hint of political influence on their judgments, there 
is in this area enough evidence from court cases and judges’ writings from 
which we can piece together an account that shows the influence of politics on 
the development of the law in this field. As I will try to demonstrate, these 
expressions do not just provide a theoretical background for the law, at times 
they also help us make more sense of the doctrinal arguments they accompany. 
I am, of course, not the first to argue that we can trace changes in private 
law doctrine to prevailing political ideas.19 Surprisingly, however, there has been 
no detailed discussion of tort liability of public authorities, an area in which the 
impact of political ideas would seem more immediately relevant. One finds in 
the literature occasional comments that acknowledge the impact of political 
ideology,20 and there are also brief comparative comments that seek to explain 
the difference between English and French law in this area to the difference 
between English (or British) and French attitudes towards the state.21 Though a 
step in the right direction, these throwaway remarks are too general and as such 
cannot explain some of the puzzles in this area, such as the more restrictive 
attitude of English courts even in comparison to other Commonwealth courts 
that share Britain’s legal tradition as well as the retrenchment in negligence 
liability of public authorities that took place during in the 1980s.  
One explanation, particularly appealing because it might seem relevant to 
explaining both these puzzles and one that might also explain the more 
restrictive attitude towards negligence liability more generally, is Thatcher’s 
premiership, or more precisely the influence of the ideas now known as 
‘Thatcherism’. Perhaps most famous for this claim is Patrick Atiyah, who 
described the law in the 1970s as reflecting a time ‘in which people still 
believed the role of the state is to take care of people “from the cradle to the 
grave”’, and suggested that some of the restrictions on tort liability against the 
                                                                                                                           
19 For contract law see Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ 
(1976) 89 Harv L Rev 1685; P.S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1977). The best known example of such arguments in tort law has been the claim that 
various doctrines (like the fellow-servant rule) or the rise of negligence were based on courts’ 
concern with the protection of the interests of business against those of employees and customers 
at the onset of the industrial revolution. See, most famously, Morton J Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1760-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977) ch. 3. 
But this thesis has been subjected to considerable criticism. See, among others, Robert L Rabin, 
‘The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation’ (1981) 15 Georgia L Rev 
925-61; Gary T Schwartz, ‘Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America: A 
Reinterpretation’ (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1717-75. 
20 For example, Mark Lunney & Ken Oliphant, Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
3rd ed., 2008) 537; cf Jane Stapleton, ‘Tort, Insurance, and Ideology’ (1995) 58 MLR 820-45, 820; 
Peter Cane, ‘Justice and Justifications for Tort Liability’ (1982) 2 OJLS 30-62, 62. 
21 A claim made, for example, in G Monti, ‘Osman v. UK—Transforming English 
Negligence Law into French Administrative Law?’ (1999) 48 ICLQ 757-78, 772-773; Duncan 
Fairgrieve, State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Law Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 265-266. 
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state that came afterwards reflect the rejection of this view.22 Besides Atiyah the 
influence of Thatcherism has been suggested by other prominent tort scholars 
as an explanation for various changes in tort liability that took place in this 
period, although none of these suggestions was developed in much detail.23 
The argument is appealing because the change in legal doctrine fits the 
political change, and it seems plausible that when New Right ideas were at 
their peak, they had impact on the judiciary in ways that reflected themselves, 
perhaps only semi-consciously, in judicial decisions from the period. However, I 
will argue below that despite its appeal this suggestion is unsatisfactory for two 
reasons. First, though the change in the law is correctly attributable to 
‘conservative judges’24 and related to the rise to prominence of conservatism in 
the political scene, it was in fact grounded in ideas quite different from those 
one would expect to see from judges seeking to implement Thatcherite 
ideology. Second, as I will try to show the explanation for the shift, though 
influenced by politics, cannot simply be one in which judges shift their opinions 
from the left to the right. My contention is, rather, that being human judges 
were influenced by major political changes in the political discourse they were 
working in, but that at the same time this influence was filtered through the 
institutional constraints that English judges see themselves working under, in 
particular the great importance attached in English (private) law for 
maintaining a clear separation of law from politics. As I argue, it is this 
institutional constraint that made certain doctrinal positions plausible against 
the backdrop of the Post-War consensus on the welfare state difficult to sustain 
once this consensus was gone. 
Here is how I plan to proceed. I begin by describing the shift in public and 
political attitudes towards public services in the years following World War II. I 
show that these changes were part of a broader change in attitude towards the 
role of the state. These changes have led to a more social conception of tort 
liability, and in particular tort liability of public authorities. I then turn to 
                                                                                                                           
22 See PS Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart, 1997) 140-141, 176; cf PS Atiyah, ‘Tort 
Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons’, [1987] Duke Law Journal 1002-
1045, 1027-28. Atiyah proposed a similar explanation for developments in contract law during the 
same period in PS Atiyah, ‘Freedom of Contract and the New Right’, in Essays on Contract 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1986) 355. 
23 See Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, ‘Authority or Reason? The Economic Consequences 
of Liability for Breach of Statutory Duty in a Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 18 European 
Business Law Review 5-75, 12-13 (focusing on liability of public authorities); Peter Cane, Tort Law 
and Economic Interests (Oxford: Clarendon, 2nd ed., 1996) 483 (limitation on the non-contractual 
protection of economic interests); David Howarth, ‘Negligence After Murphy: Time to Re-Think’ 
(1991) 50 CLJ 58-99, 65-66 (Thatcherism offered as a partial explanation of changes in the law in 
this area); KM Stanton, ‘The Decline of Tort Liability for Professional Negligence’, (1991) 44 CLP 
83, 84. For similar claims about the impact on Thatcherism on public law see Patrick McAuslan 
& John F McEldowney, ‘Legitimacy and the Constitution: The Dissonance between Theory and 
Practice’ in Patrick McAuslan & John F McEldowney (eds), Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution: 
Essays Marking the Centenary of Dicey’s Law of the Constitution (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
1985) 1, 33-35. 
24 As they are described in Markesinis & Fedtke, above n 23, at 5, 37, 64. 
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outlining the arguments made in support of limiting tort liability of the state. In 
section II, I first present the arguments of the kind one would hear from 
someone committed to Thatcherite ideology, and then in section III I 
demonstrate that the actual arguments found in some of the most important 
court decisions dealing with the liability of public authorities during Thatcher’s 
premiership reflect an ideology which is very different from, in some sense 
directly opposed to, Thatcherite ideas. Finally, in section IV I attempt to 
explain these developments by providing several possible explanations as to 
why the Thacherite approach did not find favour with the judges. 
I. The Changing State in Post-War Britain 
One finds in British history heroic tales of public servants dedicated to an 
impossible job, doing it neither for fame nor fortune but out of selfless desire to 
make life better for those they serve,25 alongside tales of corrupt and 
incompetent mandarins who treat their positions in the public service as 
sinecure.26 Since at any one time one could find enough stories to support both 
claims, it is tempting to dismiss these different narratives as the result of the 
ideological bias of the author. But this is not the whole story. Periods of neglect 
were followed by reforms, which had a positive impact on improving the 
quality of recruits and their work.27 One such period was after World War II. 
The British civil service, as Peter Hennessey put it, was subjected to reform by 
that ‘well-known expert in public administration, Adolf Hitler’.28 The result 
was that after the reform ‘[p]ostwar Whitehall was the place to be for the 
young and the clever with a high personal charge of public duty’.29 Similar 
trends were true of public services more generally: with the disillusion with 
laissez faire policies for their perceived responsibility for the War the stage was 
set for a significant change in attitudes regarding the role of the state and a 
corresponding massive increase in the ‘size’ of government and the sort of 
responsibilities for which the public bodies were now called to perform.30 At 
least in part these changes were accepted, even desired, due to another change 
brought about by World War II. The intense threats it posed were shown to 
have been a motivating factor in increasing social expenditure by the British 
                                                                                                                           
25 See, e.g., David Roberts, Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960) 174-176. 
26 See Richard A Chapman & JR Greenaway, The Dynamics of Administrative Reform 
(London: Colm Helm, 1980) 37-38. 
27 See Briggs, above n 6, at 85-87, 116-118; Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of 
the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2004) 155 
(discussing the 1853 reform to the Indian civil service). 
28 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Fontana, 1989) 88. 
29 Ibid., at 135. 
30 Roger Middleton, Government versus the Market: The Growth of the Public Sector, 
Economic Management and British Economic Performance, c. 1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996) §11.3. 
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government already during the war years.31 Once the threat was gone, the levels 
of expenditure were difficult to roll back; perhaps one reason why there was no 
pressure for reducing welfare expenditure was the fact that the war has left its 
mark on British society and created a sense of solidarity not often seen before 
between members of the different classes, as well as high levels of trust in the 
state and its institutions.32 
All this has had considerable impact on the shape that the British welfare 
state took in those years, which have led to some fundamental changes in the 
structure of British society. Importantly, these developments were the work of 
both Labour and Conservative governments: the so-called ‘consensus’ years 
following World War II were the time in which there was relative similarity, at 
least at the level of policy, on many fundamental issues on the structure of the 
economy. The leadership of both the Labour and the Conservative parties 
countenanced a mixed economy, Keynesian economic policies, and was 
committed to the maintenance, and even expansion, of the welfare state.33 
Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan is perhaps most representative 
of this brand of progressive conservatism. As early as 1938 he published The 
Middle Way,34 a book that drew inspiration from the country whose economic 
model has come over the years to symbolise benign socialism, Sweden.35 When 
twenty years later he became Prime Minister, he reiterated his continued 
adherence to its main tenets.36 Not only did he not shy away from the idea of 
planned economy, for him the conservative emphasis on patriotism meant, 
quite literally, that the state had a parent-like obligations to care for its citizens 
and make sure that the less fortunate among them are not left behind.37 
                                                                                                                           
31 See John Dryzek & Robert E Goodin, ‘Risk-Sharing and Social Justice: The Motivational 
Foundations of the Post-War Welfare State’ (1986) 16 Brit J Pol Sci 1, 11-21. 
32 See TH Marshall, Social Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: Hutchinson, 4th ed., 
1975) 82-84; Arthur Marwick, British Society Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 4th ed., 2003) 80; 
Julian Le Grand, Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights, Knaves, Pawns and Queens 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 4-7. Even literature critical of the solidarity thesis, 
acknowledges a significant elite minority that was sufficient for establishing the Post-War 
consensus. See David Kynaston, Austerity Britain: 1945-1951 (London: Bloomsbury, 2007) 39-56, 
esp. 55-56; Rodney Lowe, ‘The Second World War, Consensus, and the Foundation of the 
Welfare State’ (1990) 1 Twentieth Century Brit Hist 152-82, 174-178. 
33 Dennis Kavannagh & Peter Morris, Consensus Politics from Attlee to Major (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2nd ed., 1994) 76-77. This is not to deny that on other issues (eg, immigration, relations 
with Europe) there were still marked differences between the parties.  
34 Harold Macmillan, The Middle Way: A Study of the Problems of Economic and Social 
Progress in a Free and Democratic Society (London: Macmillan, 1938). See also Lord Kilmuir, ‘The 
Shaftesbury Tradition in Conservative Politics’ (1960) 3 J L & Econ 70. Kilmuir was the 
Conservative Lord Chancellor in 1954-62.  
35 Macmillan’s title and ideas must have been inspired by Marquis W.  Childs, Sweden: The 
Middle Way (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936). This book is briefly discussed in 
Macmillan, above n 34, 80-81. 
36 By contrast, to conservatives of the next generation Macmillan’s book could ‘hardly 
count[]’ as conservative. David Willetts, Modern Conservatism (London: Penguin, 1992) 34. 
37 See EHH Green, Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth 
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) ch. 6, esp. 160-62.  
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The consensus years and the expansion of the welfare state were reflected 
not only in the creation of new public institutions such as the National Health 
Service and the Industrial Injuries Scheme, but also in a slow but steady 
expansion of tort liability against the state and employers, an expansion that 
effectively reoriented tort law towards becoming a mechanism of insurance 
concerned with the optimal allocation of risks among different groups in 
society.38 The Beveridge Report, published during World War II contained a 
short discussion of the role of legal liability as one of the means for dealing with 
industrial accidents and proposed to replace it with an administrative procedure 
which was part of a more comprehensive welfare scheme.39 Shortly afterwards, 
the defence of common employment was abolished and the defence of 
contributory negligence was changed from full to partial defence; the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1947 largely eliminated the immunity of state bodies from 
private law claims.  
The change in political mood, and the statutory developments it begat, 
have been noticed by academic commentary. Academic lawyers writing at the 
time started talking about this area of law in terms of what it ‘does’ (instead of 
what it ‘is’), and increasingly this question has come to be examined within the 
context of its role within the welfare state.40 Towards the end of this period 
many found tort law wanting and have suggested more or less radical reforms to 
it, from no-fault liability for accidents to the replacement of the law with social 
insurance schemes.41 Even though these suggested reforms were not adopted, 
the fact that they have been made is a good indication of what was by then the 
mainstream academic view as to the appropriate way of thinking about tort law 
in the modern state.  
These changing political and social attitudes, not surprisingly, affected 
judicial attitudes on tort law as well. We can begin with East Suffolk,42 a case in 
which a majority of the House of Lords rejected a claim against public 
authorities for being unreasonably slow in fixing a broken wall; this, the 
claimants contended, resulted in losses from high tides. The majority’s opinion 
was premised on a dichotomy between powers and duties: whenever public 
authorities are given powers to act, it follows that they cannot be under a duty 
to act. Not owing such a duty, their failure to act more speedily could give rise 
to liability. Lord Atkin in dissent rejected the dichotomy: being given a public 
                                                                                                                           
38 See White v White [1950] P 39, 58-59, for a characteristically avant garde statement from 
Denning J. 
39 Social Insurance and Allied Services (Cmd. No. 6404, 1942) 130-131. 
40 See Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ [1951] CLP 137, for an early 
functionalist study of tort law. For a comparative discussion of the ‘massive shift form individual 
tort liability to some system of private or social insurance’ see W Friedmann, Law in a Changing 
Society (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2nd ed., 1972) ch. 5. Similar themes are explored in Alfred 
Denning, Freedom under the Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1949) 72-75, 77-81. 
41 Terence G Ison, The Forensic Lottery: A Critique of Tort Liability as a System of Personal 
Injury Compensation (London: Staples, 1967); PS Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation, and the Law 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970) 611-614. 
42 East Suffolk River Catchment Board v Kent [1941] AC 74 (HL). 
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(statutory) power does not entail that one is not at the same time also under a 
common law duty to take reasonable care not injure others, a duty that exists 
‘whether a person is performing a public duty, or merely exercising a power 
which he possesses either under statutory authority or in pursuance of his 
ordinary rights as a citizen’.43  
To see how the law changed in the following years we need to identify 
two kinds of change, since it is only by understanding the way both have 
operated together that we can make sense of developments in Post War tort 
law. The first, and more familiar, change is the emergence of a general duty of 
care and a general tort of negligence. This, however, was a slow process. 
Donoghue did not become the leading case it now is overnight.44 It was only in 
the late 1960s that it became established in this way. In Dorset Yacht Lord Reid 
said that though ‘the well-known passage’ from Lord Atkin’s decision ‘should 
not be treated as if it were a statutory definition … it ought to apply unless 
there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion’.45 And in Anns 
Lord Wilberforce went as far as to say of the majority’s opinion in East Suffolk 
that ‘the conception of general duty of care … had not at the time become fully 
recognised’.46 This was a polite way of overruling the majority’s opinion in East 
Suffolk in favour of Lord Atkin’s dissent (an opinion not surprisingly thought to 
have had a better grasp of the principle established in Donoghue). Though 
important, it must be borne in mind that this development was not confined to 
liability of public authorities. 
The question remains,, however, what was it that led to the broader, 
general duty, reading of Donoghue. To answer this question we must attend to a 
second change that was taking place at the same time in judicial attitudes about 
the relationship between individual and the state. Here, most of the important 
statements come from extra-judicial writings of some of the leading judges at 
the time. As early as 1953 Lord Radcliffe explained that this was ‘the Century of 
the Plaintiff’, because of ‘[t]he widespread use of insurance, so that people have 
come to feel that there is no loss or mischance that ought not somehow to be 
made good to the sufferer—by someone else’. And he added, ‘so much of 
industry and public activity is now conducted by large impersonal corporations 
with large impersonal resources … [so] it hardly seems even unkind to make 
them pay for every sort of damage that an individual may have met with at 
their hands’. In the end he put it to ‘humanitarianism’, the sense that makes 
                                                                                                                           
43 Ibid, 89. In some of his remarks Lord Atkin was willing to go much further than 
contemporary or future courts. He suggested that ‘something might be said for … a shopkeeper 
on [a] route under repair who is for an unreasonably long time deprived of access to his premises 
for himself and his customers’. Ibid, 91.  
44 In PA Landon, Pollock’s Law of Torts (London: Stevens and Sons, 15th ed., 1951) 258 n 20 
it is stated, for example, that ‘all that Donoghue … has done is to add a new category of 
negligence to our law’. See ibid, 257-261, for a disapproving discussion of the case; see also 
Landon’s triumphant note on East Suffolk (1941) 57 LQR 179, which he took to be a return to the 
‘traditional exposition’ (ibid., 181) of negligence, ‘shorn of [the] terrors’ (ibid., 183) of Donoghue. 
45 Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004, 1027. 
46 Anns v Metron London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 757 (HL).  
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people ‘indignant’ to learn that ‘there can be grievances in all the dark and 
irresponsible record of human affairs which the law is not equipped with a 
remedy to put right’.47  
It is important to recognise that this new conception of the relationship 
between individual and the state was something that judges at the time were 
fully aware of, and that their refashioning of aspects of tort law, especially 
negligence, were attempts to make sure the law remains in line with these new 
developments. The main tool was an increasingly frequent acknowledgement of 
the significance of ‘policy’ considerations.48 In one particularly clear statement 
Lord Radcliffe has criticised the English courts for taking the wrong kind of 
considerations into account when appealing to public policy. What they should 
consider are not so much on ‘what the State or the public requires in its own 
interest’, but rather on ‘what the public should guarantee to the individual for 
the protection of his essential dignity’.49  
Other statements were even more direct. In Hedley Byrne Lord Pearce said 
there that the scope of the duty of care will be determined ‘upon the courts’ 
assessment of the demands of society for protection from the carelessness of 
others’.50 Speaking more generally, Lord Wilberforce, who would go on to 
deliver the main speech in Anns only a few years later, rejected the view that it 
is always the ‘criminal law, rather than the civil law is [that is] … the better 
instrument for conveying social disapproval, or for redressing a wrong to the 
social fabric…’.51 Around the same time Lord Denning, who has cast 
considerable influence on the development of tort law in this period, has 
written that the ‘reason why the law of negligence has been extended so as to 
embrace nearly all activities in which people engage … is that, when severe loss 
is suffered by any one singly, it should be borne, not by him alone, but be 
spread throughout the community at large’. Even the requirement of fault that 
was still retained in the law was not explained by appeal to any moral or legal 
notion of rights, but simply because ‘compensation without fault would make 
society bankrupt.’52  
The combined effect of the two developments just described has been, 
put simply, to introduce a new conception of tort law as one of the means by 
which the modern welfare state operates. In particular it is interesting to see 
                                                                                                                           
47 Viscount Radcliffe, ‘The Place of Law Courts in Society’ in Not in Feather Beds, above n 
18, 27, 32-33; see also Nettleship v Weston [1971] 2 QB 691, 699 (CA). 
48 Dorset Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office [1969] 2 QB 412, 426-427 (CA); Lord Reid, ‘The Judge 
as Law Maker’ (1972) 12 JPSTL (n.s.) 22, 27; Lord Radcliffe, The Law and Its Compass (London: 
Faber, 1960) 40-41. 
49 Ibid, 57. 
50 Hedley Byrne and Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 536 (HL), quoted 
approvingly by Lord Denning MR and Edmund-Davies LJ in Dorset Yacht [1969] 2 QB 412, 426, 
433 (CA). 
51 Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd (No 1) [1972] AC 1027, 1114 (HL). 
52 Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworths, 1979) 280. See also his 
statement in Dorset Yacht [1969] 2 QB 412, 426 (CA) (‘This talk of “duty” or “no duty” is simply a 
way of limiting the range of liability’).  
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how the two developments were used to overcome doctrinal hurdles that stood 
in the way of developing the law in what was thought to be the desired 
direction. The wide reading of Donoghue in the context Dorset Yacht and Anns 
established the idea that as far as the citizen is concerned the state is its 
‘neighbour’ for much of what it does. Typically, Lord Denning was clearest on 
this front. In Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District Council, decided a few years 
before Anns and dealing with similar issues, he wrote: ‘[The local council] were 
entrusted by Parliament with the task of seeing that houses were properly built. 
They received public funds for the purpose. The very object was to protect 
purchasers and occupiers of houses. Yet they failed to protect them. Their 
shoulders are broad enough to bear the loss.’53 This was the welfare state 
consensus translated into legal doctrine.  
Dutton is important for another, and perhaps more significant, doctrinal 
innovation. According to familiar negligence doctrine, either one has a duty of 
care or one does not. As we have seen the majority in East Suffolk has taken the 
existence of a statutory power to exclude the existence of a duty, thus dooming 
the claim to fail. Lord Denning overcame this conflicting (and formally binding) 
case by dismissing as a ‘mistake’ the distinction drawn there between power and 
duty. In the context of the welfare state, the logical distinction disappears, or 
rather a third category, a ‘middle term’ between the two, becomes operative: 
what really was pertinent, says Denning, is that the state had ‘control’ over 
‘every stage of the work’.54 ‘Control’ is the kind of relation that exists in the 
relations between employees and employers or between individuals and the 
state, and it is one that is markedly different from the relation that exists 
between individuals who are more-or-less equally situated. When the degree of 
control entrusted to a body is extensive, it is this control that is the basis for the 
duty of care. With this idea, the distinction drawn in East Suffolk between 
harms that were the result of risks or harms caused by actions of the defendant 
and cases in which the risk was created by natural causes could have been 
rejected, because either way the state had control. When the state was put in 
charge and has extensive control, it matters little whether the risk was created 
by the state, for the state was given (or has taken) control for the sake of 
reducing risks. Having failed to do so, ‘its shoulders are broad enough to bear the 
loss’.55  
Of the two developments just described most academic attention has been 
directed at the first. Since that development could more easily be 
accommodated within the ‘private’ law conception of tort law, it was more 
easily identified, and whether liked or not, it could have been fit within familiar 
legal categories. The second development, by contrast, challenged the 
separation between private law and public law, and hovered close to the 
                                                                                                                           
53 Dutton v Bognor Regis Urban District Council [1972] 1 QB 373, 398 (CA). 
54 Ibid., 391-392. From a purely doctrinal perspective the way Sachs LJ, ibid., at 402-403, 
avoided East Suffolk by distinguishing it as dealing with omission is no less problematic. 
55 Ibid., 398. 
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boundary between law and politics. To many lawyers it was thus perhaps less 
visible, and undoubtedly less acceptable. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
some commentators found Anns and the decisions following it difficult to 
understand. Ignoring the second development that Anns rested on, the decision 
could be described, improbably, as the result of ‘errors in legal analysis’56 that 
somehow afflicted a unanimous House of Lords (as well as other appellate 
courts throughout the Commonwealth). But once the second development is 
brought into the picture, it is clear why such claims are overly simplistic. Anns 
was not the result of some oversight, or even a simple case of judges 
unconsciously following the zeitgeist. What we see, rather, are attempts to 
change the law to fit what were perceived to be new kinds of relationships 
between individual and state. As the many statements from the most 
prominent judges57 of the period in pushing the law in this new direction show 
they clearly recognised that they were changing the law and clearly thought that 
their actions were necessary for reshaping tort law to better fit the modern 
welfare state that was at the heart of the post War consensus. And it was this 
consensus that allowed the courts to bring about such changes without fearing 
that in doing so they are intruding into the unacceptable domain of politics. 
II. The Thatcher Years 
By the time Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister there was a 
growing sense that something has gone wrong: the idea that Britain has become 
‘ungovernable’ has become a truism expressed by many from a wide range of 
the political spectrum. More and more have subscribed to the view that it was 
the hitherto sacred cow of the welfare state that was to blame for many of the 
ills that have befallen British society. By that time the solidarity and trust of the 
Post-War years were largely depleted,58 and with them also the attraction of 
public service. Reforms were sometimes mooted, but lack of external pressure 
or sufficient interest from most prime ministers meant that not much has been 
done.59 All this changed when Thatcher took over. Suddenly external pressure 
                                                                                                                           
56 Robert Stevens, ‘Torts’ in Louis Blom-Cooper et al (eds), Judicial House of Lords 1876-
2009 (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 629, 651. Incidentally, the legal error view has been 
explicitly rejected in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1996] AC 624, 642 (PC (NZ)): In this 
area ‘there is no single right correct answer’ but rather different responses based ‘at least in part 
on policy considerations … [that depend on] community standards and expectations’. 
57 The most important judges in this context are Lord Radcliffe, Lord Reid, and Lord 
Denning. None of them could be described as a leftwing firebrand, and yet they were, to varying 
degrees willing to openly discuss the creative role of the judge. For a general discussion of their 
contribution see Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: The House of Lords as a Judicial Body, 1800-
1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978) 445-59, 468-505.  
58 See Jose Harris, ‘Political Ideas and the Debate on State Welfare, 1940-45’, in Harold L 
Smith (ed), War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986) 233, 256-257; Le Grand, above n 32, at 7-11. 
59 Rodeny Lowe, ‘Lessons from the Past: The Rise and Fall of the Classic Welfare State in 
Britain, 1945-76’, in Ann Oakley & A Susan Williams (eds), The Politics of the Welfare State 
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from a troubled economy and political will for public service reform were both 
in abundance and were well received by a society no longer ‘servile’ in its 
willingness to accept what were perceived to be poor services.60  
Just as importantly, Thatcher brought with her an ideology that looked at 
government and its institutions with mistrust. The welfare state was disliked for 
tending to divert the most talented people out of wealth-creating business and 
putting them in business-stifling bureaucracy, and for creating a culture of 
dependency instead of a culture of responsibility.61 The question I explore in 
this section is whether these shifts had an impact on the judiciary in the area of 
liability of public authorities, and if they did, what it was.  
(a) New Right in the House of Commons: The State Can Only 
Do Wrong 
Commentators disagree on the degree to which Thatcher (or Thatcherism) 
is a continuation or departure from conservative ideas.62 It is clear, though, that 
she had little patience for Burkean incrementalism or the retention of 
institutions that withstood the test of time; nor has she harboured 
Oakeshottean suspicions of ‘rationalist’ attempts at political ‘science’. Thatcher 
believed that one could glean from the doctrinaire works of the likes of 
Friedrich von Hayek or Milton Friedman guiding principles for reform of 
government and society. If those called for radical changes to, or even the 
elimination of, old institutions, so be it.  
For Thatcher this has meant that the public sector was in need of radical 
reform. It was a constant source of suspicion and a frequent target of criticism,63 
which was in line with the ideological dislike of New Right thinkers for state 
institutions in general and welfare institutions in particular.64 These structural 
changes were grounded in deep ideological shifts in thinking about the relation 
between the public and private sectors, and more generally between citizen and 
state. In the former area the changes have resulted in privatisation, deregulation, 
and in attempt to model the remaining public services on the methods of the 
                                                                                                                           
(London: UCL Press, 1994) 37, 48-49; Rodney Lowe, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed., 2005) 98-99. 
60 Graham Mather, ‘Government by Contact’, in Frank Vibert (ed.), Britain’s Constitutional 
Future (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1991) 73, 75-76. 
61 See, for example, Ralph Harris, Beyond the Welfare State: An Economic, Political and 
Moral Critique of Indiscriminate State Welfare, and a Review of Alternatives to Dependency 
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1988) 22-23.  
62 Compare EHH Green, ‘The Strange Death of Tory England’ (1991) 2 Twentieth Century 
Brit Hist 67-88, 88 (Thatcher’s ‘Conservative government … had very little to do with 
Conservatism’) with D. Willetts, above n 36, 47, who emphasises the continuities.  
63 Andrew Gamble, ‘Privatization, Thatcherism, and the British State’, (1988) 16 J L & Soc 
1-21, 7; Dennis Kavanagh, Thatcherism and British Politics: The End of Consensus? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1990) 110-111; John Clarke & Janet Newman, The Managerial 
State: Power, Politics and Ideology in the Remaking of Social Welfare (London: Sage, 1997) 14-15. 
64 John Clarke, ‘Dissolving the Public Realm? The Logics and Limits of Neo-Liberalism’ 
(2004) 33 J Soc Policy 27-48, 30-34. 
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private sector.65 In the latter, they resulted in attempts to limit the strength and 
breadth of the social safety net. 
At first, this may seem to support expansion of liability of public 
authorities, for someone holding such a view would tend to reject the idea that 
the state should be treated any differently from others, which would imply that 
any immunities enjoyed by public authorities should be abolished. 
Furthermore, such an approach has been used by some writers to contemplate 
a rethinking of the relationship between state and individuals along the lines of 
the relationship between a service provider and customer. Thus, for example, 
writing in a publication of the Institute of Economic Affairs, the most 
prominent British New Right think-tank, Graham Mather suggested that public 
services should be understood in contractual terms, an approach that implies 
having to pay compensation for ‘breach’.66  
All this might suggest that if anything, Thatcherism would lead to the 
expansion of liability on the state, but historically this has not been the case, 
and for reasons that are not difficult to see. Though some arguments may be 
associated with fear that such liability may lead to an undesired expansion of 
state institutions, I believe it is moral arguments that provide a more 
illuminating explanation. The basic idea is has to do with the perceived 
detrimental impact that imposing liability on the state will have on personal 
responsibility.67 Expanding the scope of tort liability on the state effectively 
turns it into an insurer of last resort, one that potentially covers all possible 
activities and has no effective limits on the scope of its liability, thus 
transforming tort law from a regime that deals with the ‘private’ relations 
between individuals into one component within the ‘public’ welfare system. 
This, according to this view, leads to moral bankruptcy. Thatcher’s famous 
dictum that ‘there is no such thing as a society’ is often said by her defenders to 
have been taken out of context.68 When brought into context it is clear that she 
was concerned about a society in which people do not take responsibility for 
their actions, and are given, by an over-pampering state, disincentives for self-
improvement. It is thus an individualistic call for greater self-reliance and 
responsibility, and—what is merely the other side of the same coin—the 
demand that they stop looking to ‘blame others for their misfortunes’.69  
The link between welfare and morality makes familiar New Right ideas 
easy to translate into arguments against the expansion of tort liability of public 
                                                                                                                           
65 On the ‘new public management’ see Christopher Hood, ‘A Public Management for All 
Seasons?’ (1991) 69 Pub Admin 3-19. 
66 Mather, above n 60, at 73-75, 82-84, 87-88. 
67 The link between ideas of self-help and personal responsibility and small government has 
a long history. See, for example, THE Travers, ‘Samuel Smiles and the Origins of “Self-Help”: 
Reform and the New Enlightenment’, (1977) 9 Albion 161-87, 163, 175-81. For Thatcher’s praise 
for exactly these values see the quote in Robert E Goodin, ‘Social Welfare as Collective Social 
Responsibility’, in Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility (1998) 97, 102. 
68 For the full quote see Willetts, above n 62, at 47-48. 
69 Atiyah, above n 22, at 138; cf Peter Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation and the Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 7th ed., 2006) 462. 
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authorities. If tort law is understood as a system of personal responsibility,70 
then it would be a mistake, both conceptual and moral, to introduce welfare 
components to it by expanding the liability of public authorities. A basic 
premise of this view is that a rational, planning, person should take possible 
future misfortunes into consideration when deciding on future action. On this 
view it is often the injured person’s failure to consider possible mishaps and to 
protect herself against them (either by investing in safety measures to reduce 
the risk or by purchasing insurance to reduce the impact of the harm) that is 
responsible for her misery.71 On many occasions it is the ‘victim’ who will be in 
a better position, epistemically and morally, than anyone else to consider 
potential harm that might befall her. In this regard there is nothing to 
distinguish the risk of harm from, say, an earthquake from the risk of harm 
brought about by the actions of other people: both are potential setbacks for 
which one often can, and therefore should, adequately prepare in advance.72 
Even if the claimant is not similarly situated to prevent an injury from 
occurring, she will often be in a position to decide for herself whether and to 
what degree she wishes to deal with its potential impact. In such cases, it is an 
open question why the defendant should be required to compensate for what 
the claimant herself was also in a position identify, and therefore to do 
something about.73  
A related but somewhat different way of getting to similar conclusions 
emphasises the importance of choice. ‘Choice is the essence of morality’,74 
Thatcher once said, and expansion of tort liability might be thought to remove 
this choice. The rational, planning, person should be given the choice whether 
to protect herself against potential risks or whether to run the risk, as well as 
                                                                                                                           
70 ‘Margaret Thatcher was often credited, when she was in office, with defending tort 
liability as a system of personal responsibility.’ PS Atiyah, ‘Personal Injuries in the Twenty First 
Century: Thinking the Unthinkable’, in Peter Birks (ed), Wrongs and Remedies n the Twenty-First 
Century (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1996) 1, 1.  
71 It is thus interesting to compare Lord Radcliffe words quoted in the text accompanying 
above n 47, where the availability of insurance was thought an argument for expansion of tort 
liability, with the position by Lord Hoffmann (whose tort law judgments come closest to 
endorsing New Right ideology), that the availability of insurance is reason not to impose tort 
liability. See Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 955, 958 (HL). 
72 See, for example, Richard A Epstein, ‘Catastrophic Responses to Catastrophic Risks’ 
(1996) 12 J Risk & Uncertainty 287-308, 293; Louis Kaplow, ‘Transition Policy: A Conceptual 
Framework’ (2003) 13 J Contemporary Legal Issues 161-209, 177; cf JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence: 
The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’ (2002) 76 Australian LJ 432, 433 (‘The practical operation 
of the tort of negligence sometimes give inadequate weight to the conduct of the plaintiff’).  
73 Legal economists would draw the line at the point in which it is cheaper for the potential 
injurer to prevent the harm than it is for the victim. But rights-based libertarian accounts would 
tend to dismiss or underplay the role cost-benefit analysis in the question of determining 
individuals’ responsibilities to each other. See, e.g., Richard A Epstein, ‘A Theory of Strict 
Liability’ (1973) 2 J Legal Stud 151-204, 151-152, passim; Peter W Huber, Liability: The Legal 
Revolution and Its Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1990) 6. 
74 Quoted in Bill Jordan, The Common Good: Citizenship, Morality and Self-Interest (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1989) 19 n 1. Similar quotes are found in Geoffrey Finlayson, Citizen, State, and Social 
Welfare in Britain 1839-1990 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 358-359.  
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the choice, if she elects to protect herself against the risk, on how to do so (for 
example, by changing her level of activity, adopting safety measures, or by 
getting insurance). By imposing tort liability on an activity the law removes 
potential victims’ ability to choose between engaging in uninsured but cheaper 
activity and insured but more expensive one, and effectively adds compulsory 
insurance to the costs of the activity to which all have to pay through their 
taxes.75 In other words, expansion of tort liability both creates moral hazard in 
providing incentives for people to take less care over themselves and can also 
operate to remove the choice of those people who wish to take responsibility 
over themselves. 
The question we need to examine now is whether we find these ideas in 
the decisions limiting tort liability of public authorities in the 1980s. I argue in 
what follows that we do not. 
(b) Old Tories in the House of Lords: The State Can Do No 
Wrong  
The New Right ideas were by no means unanimously favoured by 
members of Thatcher’s party. Many prominent members of the Conservative 
party’s old guard believed Thatcher’s views had little to do with the Tory 
tradition with which the party had been associated for a long time. Harold 
Macmillan, by then styled Earl of Stockton, spent the last years of his life 
bitterly criticising his party’s government for getting ‘nothing right’.76 Another 
former Conservative prime minister, Edward Heath, was similarly critical of the 
Thatcher government for losing its way.77  
My argument will be that the retrenchment of liability in the 1980s is 
closer to the views of these critics of Thatcher rather than to hers. At least in 
the decade in which the change in scope of tort liability began, it is not easy to 
find court decisions that express the same suspicious attitude towards public 
authorities;78 one can, however, identify in judicial decisions from this period 
                                                                                                                           
75 See, e.g., Huber, above n 73, 207-219.  
76 Stephen Evans, ‘The Earl of Stockton’s Critique of Thatcherism’ (1998) 51 Parliamentary 
Aff 17, 27. In addition to charting Macmillan’s critique, the essay is also useful for summarising 
younger Conservatives’ contrary view that it was Macmillan’s policies that were responsible for 
many of Britain’s later troubles. See ibid., 32-34. See also n 36 above; Ivor Crewe & Donald D 
Searing, ‘Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party’, (1988) 82 Am Pol Sci Rev 361-84, 
364.  
77 See Finlayson, n 74, 366-367; Stephen Evans, ‘Thatcher and the Victorians: A Suitable 
Case for Comparison?’ (1997) 82 History 601-20, 608-610. 
78 Such ideas become more prominent only a decade or more later, especially in the 
judgments of Lord Hoffmann. See n 71 above; Gorringe, [32] (Lord Hoffmann); Tomlinson v 
Congleton BC [2003] UKHL 47, [2004] 1 AC 46, [81] (Lord Hobhouse). Lord Hoffmann’s 
influence over his colleagues may be one reason why these ideas persist today. This idea is 
suggested by Markesinis & Fedtke, above n 23, but the limitation of the tort liability of public 
authority started well before he joined the House of Lords in 1995, and as I argue in the text is 
based on different ideas.  
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what have been described as the ‘traditional Conservative ideals’ of ‘strong 
government, patriotism, and authority’.79 
To proponents of this approach the state should retain under its control 
certain inherently ‘public’ services, not merely by not outsourcing them to 
private providers, but also by refusing to conceive of these services, and thereby 
its relation to its citizens, in contractual terms. The ‘paternalism’ between the 
state and the individual is the benign concern of the state to those left behind. 
It is, rather, the relation that exists between subjects and the patria, that is, one 
that reflects more the ‘despotism of parenthood’.80 This ‘Tory culture’ 
emphasised ‘deferential attitudes towards authority … [an] anti-egalitarian ethos 
and … status hierarchy’.81 Where Burke spoke of the ‘generous loyalty to rank 
and sex, that proud submission, that dignified obedience, that subordination of 
the heart’,82 latter-day Tories explained that ‘[i]t is the absolute duty of the state 
to have power over its subject … [and] therefore [the state must] withdraw 
from every economic arrangement which puts it at the absolute mercy of 
individual citizens.’83 This patrician Tory tradition thus rejected both the view 
that state institutions are dangerous entities whose domain should be curtailed 
as much as possible and the one that saw citizens as customers who are in a 
position to make demands from it.  
It is almost inevitable that this approach perceives public authorities to be 
populated by competent, altruistically-motivated, public servants.84 And it is 
this attitude that one finds in the central cases dealing with liability of public 
authorities from the 1980s. Perhaps the clearest encapsulation is found in Hill v 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, one of the leading case in the trend to limit 
liability of public authorities. As Lord Keith wrote there:  
Potential existence of [tort] liability [of public authorities] may in many 
instances be in the general public interest, as tending towards the observance 
of a higher standard of care in the carrying on of various different types of 
activity. I do not, however, consider that this can be said of police activities. 
The general sense of public duty which motivates police forces is unlikely to 
be appreciably reinforced by the imposition of such liability so far as concerns 
                                                                                                                           
79 Crewe & Searing, above n 76, 365. 
80 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1984) 110-111: 
‘postal service[, for example,] is indispensable to the life of the community … Automatically, 
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their function in the investigation and suppression of crime. From time to time 
they make mistakes in the exercise of that function, but it is not to be doubted 
that they apply their best endeavours to the performance of it.85 
Lord Keith was not alone in this view. In Calveley v Chief Constable of 
Merseyside Lord Bridge expressed a very similar view: 
it would plainly be contrary to public policy, in my opinion, to prejudice the 
fearless and efficient discharge by police officers of their vitally important 
public duty of investigating crime by requiring them to act under the shadow 
of a potential action for damages for negligence by the suspect.86 
It is tempting to think that this attitude was confined only to the police, 
against whom British courts have a long history of timidity.87 But the similar 
statements are found in cases dealing with other public authorities. In another 
opinion penned by Lord Keith, this time in a Privy Council decision on an 
appeal from New Zealand, he has written with regard to a claim against a 
minister, who made administrative decision that was found by the New 
Zealand courts to have been based on an irrelevant consideration: 
in the nature of things, it is likely to be very rare indeed that an error of law of 
this kind by a minister or other public authority can properly be categorised as 
negligent. As is well known, anybody, even a judge, can be capable of 
misconstruing a statute; and such misconstruction, when it occurs, can be 
severely criticised without attracting the epithet ‘negligent.’ Obviously, this 
simple fact points rather to the extreme unlikelihood of a breach of duty being 
established in these cases…. 88 
Though this discussion looks as though it deals with the question of 
breach, it appears in the judgment under the heading of ‘duty of care’ and it 
leads the court to the conclusion that ‘it would … be in the public interest that 
citizens should be confined to their remedy … in those cases where the 
minister or public authority has acted in bad faith’.89 Considerations such as the 
importance of the rule of law, the importance of subjecting executive action to 
legal oversight, and the retrospective application of legal interpretation, could 
all have swayed the decision in a different direction, but in the end it was the 
same traditional Tort attitude toward state institutions that carried the day.90   
                                                                                                                           
85 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53, 63 (HL).  
86 Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1989] AC 1228, 1238 (HL).  
87 See Robert Stevens, The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution (Oxford: 
Hart, rev. ed., 2005) 75. 
88 Rowling v Takaro Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473, 502 (PC (NZ)).  
89 Ibid, 503.  
90 One need only look at the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal to see a 
completely different attitude to the relation between citizen and state and hence to liability of 
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than stress the importance of government officials complying with the law the Privy Council’s 
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A final example, this time dealing with a local authority, comes from a 
somewhat later decision from the Court of Appeal: 
One advantage that is claimed for imposing a duty of care is that it encourages 
people not to be negligent. … [But] even if psychiatrists and social workers 
were likely to have to pay damages personally, I do not suppose that they 
would be any less caring for children in need than they are already; they might, 
as I have said, adopt defensive practices; but I doubt if their general level of 
care would change.91 
This attitude helps explain the widely-discussed ‘defensiveness’ argument, 
which alleges that the imposition of liability on public services is likely to lead 
to a defensive attitude of the public authority, an argument that in fact appears 
immediately after the passage quoted above from Hill.92 The defensiveness 
argument has been (rightly) criticised by commentators for lack of empirical 
evidence, and recently, some judges expressed unease about it.93 But it makes 
much more sense on the assumption that public services are populated by 
officials who are altruistically-motivated and (barring the occasional inevitable 
mistake) are doing a good job. If this is the case, it follows that any imposition 
of liability on them will inevitably lead to over-deterrence and to the feared 
defensive frame of mind. Without such an assumption it is difficult to make 
any general claim on the likely effect of public services.  
In none of the cases discussed above was this line of argument the only one 
mentioned. Perhaps next to the other arguments, the words quoted above may 
have looked like empty rhetorical flourishes, what may explain why this 
particular argument against the imposition of tort liability has received 
relatively little attention even in books that tried to examine the impact of 
                                                                                                                           
said that a minister is under a duty to seek legal advice’ Rowling [1988] AC 473, 502. It is worth 
noting that a decade later a less imperialistic Privy Council conceded that the New Zealand 
approach reflects a different political attitude, and let a decision affirming Anns and rejecting 
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91 M v Newham London Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 675- 676 (CA). See also Brooks v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495, at [38] (‘The fact 
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92 See also Lord Keith’s fear of ‘overkill’ from the imposition of tort liability in Rowling, at 
502, and Murphy, at 472. 
93 See Brooks v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495 
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ideology on adjudication.94 But there is no reason to ignore an argument that 
appears in many of the central decisions on the subject, especially as essentially 
the same argument is found in East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v Kent,95 the 
case that provided the doctrinal and intellectual foundation for Hill and the 
cases that followed it. In this case Lord Thankerton says ‘there are special 
circumstances in the case of statutory bodies … which should lead to the 
application of a less exacting standard than ordinarily prevails’, because in the 
circumstances in which they operate ‘much may be condoned as well-meant 
error of judgment’. And crucially, these observations are not made specific to 
the case, but rather are mentioned ‘for future guidance’.96  
To highlight the uniqueness of this ideological perspective it is worth 
comparing it to its two main competitors considered above. First, consider the 
attitude found in a tort law textbook whose explanations of the law are often 
informed by New Right ideology:  
While we would agree with one commentator that ‘fraud, laziness, ineptitude 
and money-grabbing are the hallmark of Britain’s public sector’ … it is not 
clear that finding that a duty of care was owed in this kind of case would bring 
about any improvement in the dismal performance of public bodies in the UK. 
… [E]xpanding the scope of public bodies’ liability in negligence only serves to 
starve them of the money they need to perform their services, as more and 
more of their funding is diverted into paying for litigation and making 
compensation payments to claimants.97 
It is not difficult to see that this view is diametrically opposed to what one 
finds in the 1980s cases.98 Even more interestingly, the attitude found in the 
cases is also fundamentally different from the view one finds during the period 
of political consensus on the welfare state. In Dorset Yacht (of all cases) the 
imposition of tort liability was challenged by the suggestion that it would lead 
to an overly defensive attitude. The response of Lord Reid, who as we have 
seen was one of the architects of the social reformulation of negligence liability, 
highlights the difference in attitude towards public authorities. After quoting 
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from a New York Court of Appeal decision that relied on the defensiveness 
argument to limit liability on public authorities, Lord Reid famously said: 
It may be that public servants in the State of New York are so apprehensive, 
easily dissuaded from doing their duty, and intent on preserving public funds 
from costly claims, that they could be influenced in that way. But my 
experience leads me to believe that Her Majesty’s servants are made of sterner 
stuff. … I can see no good ground in public policy for giving immunity to a 
Government Department.99 
Like the 1980s cases (and unlike the New Right view) Lord Reid’s words show 
a positive attitude towards public authorities. Where he is different, however, 
is in coupling this position with a view regarding the changing role of the state, 
which results in his unwillingness to adopt the deferential attitude towards 
public authorities which played such a central role in the limitation on liability 
in subsequent years. 
(c) Why Did the Judges Adopt this View? 
That the expansion of the welfare state has gone too far, that something 
needs to be done to stop Britain’s perceived decline, was a view shared by most 
conservatives in the 1980s, even the ‘wets’ who did not agree with Thatcher’s 
ideology.100 As such the outcomes of the court decisions from this period on 
tort liability of public authorities would probably have been accepted by many, 
but the argument developed so far aimed to show that we can identify more 
specific ideas about the relationship between individuals and the state that 
explain the decisions. The question that has not yet been answered is why 
judges in those years have not turned to New Right ideas.  
Unlike the identification of the ideological basis of the court’s decisions, 
explaining why they turned this way is obviously more difficult and 
speculative. I will, however, identify four factors that I believe were at play 
here. The first is the limited acceptance of Thatcherite ideology even among 
conservatives and the extent to which Thatcherite ideology may have been the 
source of clashes between the government and the judges; the second is the 
correspondence between traditional Tory understanding of the relation 
between individual and the state and similar attitudes found among members of 
the judiciary; the third concerns the similarity between old Tory ideology and 
the prevalent judicial attitudes about the common law; the fourth is that with 
the of the Post War consensus on the welfare state disappearing, the courts, 
which were seeking to maintain a non-political stance, could not openly adopt 
the highly controversial and divisive Thatcherite views; instead, a return to 
traditional Tory ideas was more easily accepted. Before turning to examine 
these explanations in more details, I must stress that some of these explanations 
are more speculative than others, and I cannot tell just how much weight each 
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consideration has had on individual judges. Some may have had a greater 
inclination towards Tory ideas to begin with and pushed forward a particular 
change in the law whereas others were just less adventurous and were willing 
to follow suit in decisions that implied a more minimal role for the courts. 
Most likely it was some kind of combination of all.  
The first point is that when considering the matter substantively, there are 
many reasons why Tory ideology would be appealing to the judges. I have 
spoken above about the centrality of authority, a combination of dedication to 
the maintenance of strong state institutions and a perception of public service 
borne out of altruistic concern for society, as central to traditional Tory 
ideology. Similar ideas also something that underlies much judicial thinking. 
Judges are not civil servants, but they belong to the public sector; and like civil 
servants they are ‘servants of the Crown’. This is not a mere technical formality: 
as Patrick Devlin conceded the judges are ‘at least as concerned as the executive 
with the preservation of law and order’.101 At the same time the status of 
servants of the Crown can explain the rejection of any sort of quasi-contractual 
relation between individuals and public service providers: as Lord Steyn put it, 
‘[t]he prime function of the police is the preservation of the Queen’s Peace’,102 
not the citizens’ rights. To all this one may add a tradition of political 
constitutionalism, which in part was (and to a great extent still is) reflected 
judicially in a deferential attitude towards state institutions,103 an attitude that 
may have been in part born out of a political tradition ‘unique among modern 
democracies … [in] lack[ing] any notion of popular sovereignty’.104  
The last point focused on the similarity between certain Tory ideas and 
the ideology of the common law. The third point focuses more on legal 
practice. There is something about legal practice, perhaps English legal practice 
in particular, that makes a certain brand of conservatism seem all the more 
natural for the judge to adopt. What judges often extol as the greatest virtues of 
the common law method are remarkably similar to what has been described as 
the intellectual foundations of conservatism: the mistrust of abstract reasoning 
(‘political wisdom is not found in the theoretical speculations of isolated 
thinkers’); traditionalism in the form of hostility to ‘sudden, precipitate and 
revolutionary change’; and organicism, the view that society is ‘unitary, natural 
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growth, an organized living whole not a mechanical aggregate’,105 a view that 
may be congenial to the common lawyer both as a description of society, but 
also (and not coincidentally) as a description of the ‘organic growth’ of the 
‘seamless web’ of the common law.  
It is hard to know whether having such views in the first place is what 
draws one to the judiciary (or helps one be a successful judge), or whether it is 
becoming a judge that tends to inculcate such views.106 Be that as it may, this 
approach is often tied to a particular judicial philosophy of restraint. It is 
notable that even doctrinal commentators have singled out the House of Lords 
of the 1980s as excessively ‘conservative’ at least with regard to its 
unwillingness to offer innovative solutions to new problems.107 This fits 
perfectly the ideology of non-ideology one finds in many writings of 
conservatism of this brand.108  
But this explanation, by itself, is too general and as such cannot account for 
both the Post-War expansion and the 1980s retrenchment. As such they can, at 
best, serve as auxiliaries to other more specific considerations. Two, I think, are 
significant. The first is that even at the height of Thatcher’s power her ideology 
was never a majority view in the public, perhaps not even among members of 
her party. It was not the majority view among Conservative MPs and candidates 
on the eve of her becoming leader of the Conservative Party,109 and it was 
controversial throughout her years as prime minister.110 Therefore, if we find 
that most of the judges were not enamoured of these ideas, this by itself need 
not be a cause for surprise. But we can say more. Toward the end of Thatcher’s 
premiership her ideology may have been partly responsible for some clashes 
between the government and the judiciary. Thatcher’s New Right circle 
‘counterpose[d] producers and parasites, the latter including both the old 
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aristocracy and the whole of the public sector’111: many senior judges could have 
been classified as members of both. Moreover, Thatcher was driven by a 
centralising ambition that sought to establish its ideology by weakening 
conflicting sources of power:112 as a result, along with the bureaucracy and local 
governments, the judges found themselves at the sharp end of government 
criticism. This, in turn, has resulted in a more critical attitude toward the 
government.113 Some of this criticism related to questions with a significant legal 
component to them such as mandatory sentencing, or the incorporation of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. But at times clashes revolved around 
the very role of the judiciary: in particular, the judges objected to the 
government’s gestures towards a more ‘managerial’ approach to the justice 
system. While for the government this represented attempts at reform similar 
to those pushed forward in the rest of the public sector, the judges took these 
as attempts to treat them ‘like the grocer’s shop at the corner of the street’.114 
The important point to notice is that such a critical approach towards the 
government could coexist with continued trust of non-political public services. 
The final, and in my view, most important consideration, looks at the 
doctrinal change in its political context. As mentioned before, for many years 
after World War II commitment to the welfare state was a mainstream political 
position. As such support for it was no longer seen as a political view. The 
courts could have expanded tort liability against the state in the Post War years 
exactly because the consensus about it among members of the political 
mainstream made it appear non-ideological.115 The welfare state was simply one 
more fact they had to take into account in shaping the path of the law. The 
courts could then more easily present the legal innovations they introduced as 
required by the uncontroversial task of adapting the common law to changing 
circumstances. But once the consensus on the welfare state evaporated, once 
the Thatcher’s views have become so prominent in the discourse, commitment 
to the expansion of the welfare state (and with it the continued expansion of 
tort liability on public authorities) could no longer have been thought of as 
politically neutral. In the new atmosphere promoting such doctrines would 
have looked like a concern with ‘social justice’, a partisan, and hence illegitimate 
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concern for a judge.116 However, for this very reason adopting the New Right’s 
solution to the problem would have been equally unappealing for the judges, for 
it too could never be seen as part of a consensus.117 Turning their back on the 
Post War developments and resurrecting the majority opinion of East Suffolk 
was thus the judges’ natural response.  
With all these considerations taken together we can now see the way in 
which Thatcher’s era may have influenced the judiciary in this area. Though, as 
I have tried to show, the decisions on public authorities handed down during 
her tenure do not invoke the sort of arguments one would expect to find from 
Thatcherite judges, it is nonetheless possible that Thatcherism made those 
decisions possible. The return to old Tory was a combination of acceptance of 
some of the political ideas that rose to prominence during the 1980s (such as 
the widely shared sense among conservatives of all stripes that many of the 
policies associated with the expanding welfare state have gone too far) together 
with a return to the old values that, with the collapse of the consensus on the 
welfare state, may even have come to represent something of a new consensus.  
Conclusion 
James Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher’s predecessor, famously said:  
There are times, perhaps once every thirty years, when there is a sea-change in 
politics. It then does not matter what you say or what you do. There is a shift 
in what the public wants and what it approves of. I suspect there is now such 
a sea-change—and it is for Mrs. Thatcher.118  
When such a shift occurs more than anything else it changes the frame of 
reference of old debates: some views that until then would have been thought 
to be beyond the pale become part of the discourse; and if only for some time, 
other views that had been part of the debate become obsolete. These major 
shifts are bound to affect judges, even if they assiduously keep away from 
everyday politics.  
Therefore, one need not go as far as to say that legal arguments are mere 
‘smokescreens’119 for the real considerations driving judicial decision. The 
considerations found in the decisions clearly have some impact on the judges, 
even if only for ‘external’ reasons of wishing to maintain the stability or clarity 
of the law. But when an ideological sea-change occurs it is likely to sweep the 
courts with it, and in such instances focusing on the minutiae of doctrine is 
likely to lead us to miss the bigger picture. In fact, given that deep ideological 
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shifts are not always easy to translate into significant changes in the political 
arena,120 there are times in which court decisions—less directly influenced by 
budgetary limits and the constraints of everyday politics—will be where we 
will see the effects of these changes more clearly than anywhere else. And even 
if not every aspect of what we call ‘private law’ can be explained as reflecting 
some political ideology, when such sea-changes occur they are going to lead to a 
reformulation of the foundations of this area of law as well.  
The change Callaghan spoke about, while it meant for many a retreat from 
what was then perceived as the excesses of the 1960s which led to the woes of 
the late 1970s, did not necessarily call for the adoption of the radical ideology of 
the New Right. To many it meant a return to reinvigorated old Tory ideas. For 
much of this essay I tried to show how the impact of these ideas helps us 
understand one of the puzzles mentioned in the beginning of this essay, the 
change that took place in the 1980s with the law relating to negligence liability 
of public authorities. But the role these ideas played, and probably still play, in 
understanding the strict limits imposed on tort liability of public authorities can 
also help us understand the other puzzle with which I opened this essay, 
namely the unusually restrictive attitude of English courts in this area of law. 
Unlike New Right ideas, which have influenced many parts of the Western 
world during the 1980s, old Tory ideas have been described as ‘peculiarly 
British’ and ‘almost unintelligible outside these islands’.121 It is perhaps these 
peculiar ideas, and their resurgence in the 1980s alongside—and sometimes in 
opposition to—Thatcherism, that help us understand the peculiarly British 
attitude to the imposition of negligence liability on public authorities. 
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